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SOCIAL BARGAINING IN STATES AND CITIES:  




Paper prepared for Harvard Law School Symposium 
“Could Experiments at the State and Local Levels Expand Collective Bargaining  
and Workers’ Collective Action?” 
 
 
A well-documented problem motivates this symposium: The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) does not effectively protect workers’ rights to organize, bargain, 
and strike.  Though unions once represented a third of American workers, today the vast 
majority of workers are non-union and employed “at will.” The decline of organization 
among workers is a key factor contributing to the rise of economic and political 
inequality in American society.	1   Yet reforming labor law at the federal level—at least 
in a progressive direction—is currently impossible.  Meanwhile, broad preemption 
doctrine means that states and localities are significantly limited in their ability to address 
the weaknesses in labor law, even where local politics would permit such gains.   
Employment law, however, does not face the same preemption hurdles as labor 
law, leaving room for experimentation at the state and local level.  This is important not 
only because traditional employment law is a critical tool for improving workers’ lives, 
but also because labor and employment law ought not be understood as separate 
categories.  Like labor law, employment law can be a tool for strengthening civil society 
and protecting workers’ collective voice.  For example, employment law can empower 
worker organizations by engaging them in enforcement activity2 and by deputizing them 
to administer benefits.3  Its provisions can protect concerted activity.4  In addition, 
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employment law can be used to enable a form of sectoral bargaining through which 
workers and employers, in conjunction with pubic officials and the general public, 
negotiate workplace standards at the sectoral level rather than at the firm level.5   
In this brief essay, I will consider how states and localities can use tripartite 
commissions or wage boards to enable public sectoral bargaining—what I will call 
“social bargaining”—consistent with federal preemption doctrine and other legal 
constraints.6  I refer to these social bargaining mechanisms as “tripartite” because, at a 
general level, they include representation from three categories: workers, business, and 
the public.  In practice, however, they typically are, and should be, multi-partite with 
individuals representing a range of worker, business, and public interests.   
To be sure, a full-fledged system of social bargaining would require new federal 
legislation.  Yet a state and local approach offers promise in the interim.  State and local 
commissions or wage boards can involve worker organizations, business organizations, 
and the public in decisions about wages, benefits, and working conditions.  In so doing, 
they can increase wages and improve conditions for workers throughout the economy; 
they can augment the role of civil society in administration; and they can help strengthen 
worker organizations, particularly if combined with other reforms.7    
I. Why Social Bargaining?   
Most industrial democracies empower unions to negotiate for workers on a 
sectoral basis.8  Through one method or another, the government extends union-
negotiated standards to workers throughout the economy, while workers also have rights 
of participation at the shop level through, for example, works councils, local unions, or 
																																																																																																																																																																					
4 Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008). 
5 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); see also DAVID ROLF, THE 
FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN 253-58 (2016); David Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement, AM. 
PROSPECT (Apr. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/toward-21st-century-labor-movement; 
Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1624 
(2016). For one account of how all these reforms fit together, see DAVID MADLAND, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, THE FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE AND POWER (2016) [hereinafter FUTURE OF 
WORKER VOICE]; see also David Madland & Alex Rowell, How State and Local Governments 
Can Strengthen Worker Power and Raise Wages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/02/166640/state-local-
governments-can-strengthen-worker-power-raise-wages/. 
6 For further discussion, see infra Parts III & IV. 
7 In earlier work, I consider the possible drawbacks of moving to a system of social or 
sectoral bargaining.  See Andrias, supra note 5.  I do not reiterate those arguments here.   
8 See STEVEN J. SILVIA, HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER 27-28, 38-41 (2013); Franz Traxler & 






competing minority unions.9  In many systems, unions also play a crucial role in 
administering benefits, giving workers an incentive to join unions.10   
Contemporary American labor law, however, does not affirmatively grant unions 
power to negotiate on behalf of all workers in a given sector; rather, it channels most 
negotiations about wages and benefits to the firm level.11  At the same time, U.S. law 
makes organizing and bargaining at the firm level extraordinarily difficult and permits 
significant resistance by employers.12  The result is that the vast majority of workers are 
unrepresented by unions and uncovered by agreements reached by unions.  Meanwhile, 
employment law is generally considered a separate regime under which workers are 
individually entitled to rights but concerning which unions have no special role.13  
In the last several years, a number of worker movements, as well as a host of 
scholars, have begun to challenge this paradigm.14  The worker movements have 
intensified their focus on organizing at a sectoral level.  They have also tried to engage 
governments, as well as employers, in efforts to raise wages and improve working 
conditions, as part-and-parcel of the organizing campaigns.  From these struggles, I have 
argued, one can glimpse the outlines of an alternative form of labor law—a labor law that 
aspires to social bargaining.15   
The social bargaining approach—i.e., government-mandated sectoral bargaining 
that addresses a range of issues of concern to workers—has significant advantages.  First, 
and perhaps most important, it is more effective than firm-based bargaining in reducing 
economic inequality.16  Researchers have shown that firm-based bargaining compresses 
wages within the firm at which it occurs.17  Yet, it tends to raise wages throughout an 
industry only if there is enough union presence in the industry or geographic area to pose 
a threat to non-unionized firms; employers raise wages to stave off unionization or to 
																																																								
9 See Andrias, supra note 5, at 6, 33-34,77-80; MADLAND, FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE, 
supra note 5.   
10 Dimick, supra note 3. 
11  See Andrias, supra note 5, at 6, 28-32.  The original New Deal briefly promised, though 
never fully achieved, a more sectoral system that integrated labor and employment law. Kate 
Andrias, Rethinking Labor’s Administration, The Lost Promise of FLSA’s Wage Boards (draft). 
12 See Andrias, supra note 5, at 25-27. 
13 Id. at 37-40. 
14 See sources cited supra notes 1-5.  
15 Andrias, supra note 5. 
16 KATHLEEN THELEN, VARIETIES OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
SOLIDARITY 5, 9-10, 194, 203-07 (2014); Jonas Pontusson, Comparative Political Economy of 
Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 281, 289-90 (2002); Michael Wallerstein, Wage Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in 
Advanced Industrial Societies, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 669, 672-76 (1999).  




compete for labor.18 This rarely occurs under our current regime.  In contrast, social 
bargaining directly affects wages throughout the labor market; agreements apply to all 
employers in the industry or region, helping create more wage compression over all.19 
Indeed, comparative studies suggest that, from the perspective of creating egalitarian 
outcomes at the societal level, the critical factor in a labor law regime is the establishment 
of broadly inclusive union organizations empowered to negotiate sectorally.20 
Second, social bargaining increases workers’ voice in public policy decisions.21  
Social bargaining gives worker organizations an official seat at the table when policy 
decisions affecting workers are made.  More generally, worker organizations’ broader 
mandate enhances their incentive and ability to serve as a counterweight to organized 
business interests in the political sphere.  And giving worker organizations, as well as 
businesses, a formal role in setting social welfare policy could be a particularly helpful 
tool if, as predicted, automation becomes more prevalent and more bargaining about 
income must occur directly with the state. 
Third, social bargaining responds well to the increasing problem of the fissured 
employer.22  Workers throughout an economic sector bargain together, whether employed 
by a lead firm, a contracted firm, or a temporary agency.  This avoids protracted legal 
battles about the identity of the employer and provides a disincentive for companies to 
subcontract with the aim of reducing labor costs.  Likewise, social bargaining can 
potentially cover both independent contractors and employees, minimizing battles over 
worker classification. 
Finally, social bargaining takes most disputes about wages and benefits outside of 
the workplace, potentially facilitating collaborative relationships between workers and 
firm managers.23 Relatedly, it addresses several of the efficiency-based objections to 
collective bargaining by changing the topics over which much bargaining occurs.24  
																																																								
18 Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 699 (2013). 
19 See Pontusson, supra note 16; Wallerstein, supra note 16. 
20 Thelen, supra note 16, at 204-07; see also SILVIA, supra note 8, at 41 (emphasizing the 
central role the law and state institutions play in sustaining the German industrial relations 
system). 
21 Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of 
American Labor Relations,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 40-43 (1990). 
22 Andrias, supra note 5, at 78. 
23 MADLAND, FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE, supra note 5. 
24  Dimick, supra note 18, at 692 (explaining that when union structures are highly 
decentralized and firm-based, the rational response of unions is to advocate for “seniority-based 
layoff policies, job definitions and demarcations, internal labor markets, rules limiting employer 




As previously noted, achieving a system of social bargaining at the federal level 
is, at least in the near term, impossible.25  Yet states and localities can make some 
progress toward the vision by creating tripartite administrative structures that include 
representatives from worker organizations, business groups, and the general public who 
then negotiate over such employment law standards as minimum wages, benefits, health 
and safety, and scheduling.     
One might wonder whether creating tripartite administrative mechanisms at the 
state or local level is worth the trouble, absent the ability to enact a system of full-fledged 
mandatory sectoral bargaining and greater protections for concerted activity.  After all, if 
workers have enough political power to enact a tripartite commission structure at the state 
or municipal level, wouldn’t they be better off just legislating higher wages or better 
standards?  Moreover, don’t tripartite commissions just create another forum in which 
workers have to marshal scarce resources, competing with more powerful companies?  
There is some force to these critiques.  Statutory gains are stickier than administrative 
gains.  Certainly, it would be foolish to forsake lasting legislative victories for temporary 
administrative achievements more easily abolished by a hostile executive.  And without a 
shift in power dynamics, tripartite commissions can, like other governmental fora, be 
dominated by elites.26 
Nonetheless, both U.S. history and experience abroad suggest that tripartite 
administrative processes, if well structured, offer advantages over a purely legislative 
approach.  At the most basic level, administrative processes offer states and localities the 
ability to address workplace issues with specificity and expertise, as well as the capacity 
to proceed with reform even in periods of legislative gridlock.  Moreover, the tripartite 
approach in particular can improve the chances of lasting gains for workers while 
enhancing civil society and civic participation more broadly.27  This is because tripartite 
commissions can increase worker organizations’ role in decisions about the political 
economy while extending the fruits of bargaining to more workers.  They can provide a 
forum for workers’ collective engagement in workplace issues while sending a message 
about the legitimacy of worker organizations.  As such, tripartite processes can facilitate 
																																																								
25 On the long history of labor law’s ossification and the difficulty of reform, see Cynthia L. 
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1611-12 (2002).    
26 On the dominance of economic elites in U.S. government see, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, 
UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 2, 285 (2008); 
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER 
IN AMERICA 79-81, 157-58 (2012); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: 
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69-95 
(2012). 
27 On history of tripartism in the U.S., see Andrias, supra note 5, at 17-18; Andrias, supra 
note 11; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT 271-98 (1995).  On 




organizing efforts.28  One might recall the CIO message that, “the President wants YOU 
to join the union!”29  In addition to signaling the legitimacy of worker organizations, 
tripartite commissions can signal the vulnerability of employers to regulation.  As 
scholars have shown, when law demonstrates that those in power are subject to a higher 
authority, law has the potential to open space for mobilization.30  Finally, if, as discussed 
below, tripartite commissions are combined with other reforms that build power for 
worker organizations, they can be a critical step in constructing a more egalitarian 
regime.31 
II. Existing Mechanisms for Social Bargaining  
How might social bargaining be operationalized at the state and local level under 
existing law?  For the most part, state and local minimum employment standards are set 
legislatively or by traditional regulatory mechanisms.32  However, a few states, including 
California, New Jersey, and New York, already vest the power to set wages or other 
standards with tripartite commissions, i.e., boards with representation from employee 
groups, industry groups, and the public.33  These commissions provide an existing 
foothold for social bargaining. 
																																																								
28 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing NY example); Andrias, supra 
note 11 (discussing ways in which wage boards facilitated organizing in the 1930s and 40s). 
29 See IRVING BERSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 
1933-1941, at 41 (1969) (quoting CIO organizers). 
30  Benjamin Sachs, Law, Organizing, and Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (analyzing sociological research and applying to labor law debates). 
31 See infra Part III. 
32 That is, a few states grant executive branch actors the power to raise wages or regulate 
hours in particular sectors of the economy following public hearings.  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. Ch. 151 § 7 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 34-06-01 to 08 (West 2014); see also 
statutes collected infra note 33.  For public hearing requirements, see, e.g, CAL. LAB. CODE § 
1178.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-108, -109; N.D. CODE ANN § 34-08. 
33 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70–74, 1173, 1178 (West 2011) (authorizing an Industrial Welfare 
Commission, appointed by the governor, and composed of two representatives of employers, two 
from recognized labor organizations, and one from the general public; requiring commission to 
review adequacy of minimum wage every two years; and providing for industry specific wage 
boards); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-109 (authorizing a wage board comprised of an equal number 
of employer, employee, and public representatives); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 
(establishing the “New Jersey Minimum Wage Advisory Commission” with “five members as 
follows: the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, ex officio, who shall serve as 
chair of the commission, and four members appointed by the Governor as follows: two persons 
who shall be nominated by organizations who represent the interests of the business community 
in this State and two persons who shall be nominated by the New Jersey State AFL-CIO”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a8, a9 (providing that commissioner may establish a wage board to set 
minimum rates for employees in particular occupations; such boards shall be composed of equal 




For example, California law provides for an Industrial Welfare Commission 
(IWC) composed of two union representatives, two employer representatives, and one 
representative from the general public.34  The governor appoints each of the five 
members with the consent of the Senate, and members serve four-year terms.35  The labor 
representatives must be drawn from “members of recognized labor organizations.”36  The 
IWC’s authority goes beyond creating a basic minimum wage: It has authority to evaluate 
wages in “any occupation, trade, or industry” to ensure they are adequate “to supply the 
cost of proper living”; it also can consider whether “the hours or conditions of labor” are 
“prejudicial to the health, morals, or welfare of employees.”37 If the IWC determines that 
wages, hours, or working conditions are inadequate, it selects a wage board—again 
composed of two labor and two employer representatives, along with a neutral party—to 
investigate and make recommendations.38  Recommendations that receive the support of 
two-thirds of the wage board’s members are incorporated into IWC proposed regulations, 
which are then subject to public hearings.39  If approved, the orders become part of the 
California Code of Regulation.40  Using this process, the IWC has issued seventeen 
orders: twelve industry orders, three occupation orders, an order that applies to any 
industry or occupation not previously exempt by the IWC’s wage orders effective as of 
1997, and one general minimum wage order.41  
New Jersey’s tripartite Minimum Wage Advisory Commission (WAC or 
Commission) is charged with annually evaluating the state’s minimum wage.42 As in 
California, the governor appoints the Commission’s members and is required to choose 
representatives from business and labor. To that end, New Jersey law incorporates a 
representative mechanism, specifying that the business representatives “shall be 
nominated by organizations who represent the interests of the business community in this 
State” and that the labor representatives “shall be nominated by the New Jersey State 
																																																																																																																																																																					
establishment of a tripartite wage board, but only to address wages of minors. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23–314.    
34 CAL. LAB. CODE. § 70.1 (West 2011). The IWC dates to 1913, but until the 1970s applied 
to women and child workers only. See Indus. Welfare Comm. v. Superior Court, 613 P.2d 579, 
583-84 (Cal. 1980). 
35 CAL. LAB. CODE. § 70. 
36 Id. § 70.1.   
37 Id. § 1178.  
38 Id. §§ 1178, 1178.5. 
39 Id. § 1178.5(c). 
40 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11531 (West, Westlaw through Register 2017, No. 44). 
41 Department of Industrial Relations, IWC Wage Orders-Prior, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/wageorderindustriesprior.htm.  
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 et seq. (West 2016); Id. § 34:11-56a4.8(a). See also   
Minimum Wage Advisory Commission, STATE OF N.J., DEP’T OF LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lwdhome/MinWageCommission.html (describing mission of 




AFL-CIO.”43  Unlike in California, however, the Commission has no representatives 
from the public; instead, the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development fills 
that function and serves as the Commission’s chair.  And WAC does not have authority 
over benefits or working conditions.  The law does, however, allow the Commissioner to 
establish sectoral wage boards, composed of labor and business representatives, which 
then recommend minimum wages in particulars sectors.  Wage boards can be established 
if the Commissioner believes “that a substantial number of employees in any occupation 
or occupations are receiving less than a fair wage.”44  The law also provides for a public 
hearing process after which the Commissioner decides whether to approve or reject the 
report.45 
To date, the experience with state-level tripartite commissions has been mixed.  
Some wage boards, including Colorado’s, appear to have been moribund for years.46  In 
other states, like California and New York, wage boards have been used successfully at 
times.  However, no commission is actively or aggressively setting employment 
standards today.  Indeed, the California IWC has been without funding since 2004.47  The 
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement continues to enforce the existing 
wage orders, and the legislature has not repealed the IWC’s statutory responsibilities, but 
the current status of the IWC can be characterized as an unfunded legislative mandate.48    
In New York, the Fight for $15 movement recently used the state wage board 
with success.  In 2015, after growing protests and strikes organized by the Fight for $15, 
and at the request of Governor Andrew Cuomo, the NY labor commissioner exercised his 
authority to impanel a wage board to recommend higher wages in the fast food industry.49  
																																																								
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. Id. § 34:11-56a4.7. 
44 Id. § 34:11-56a8. 
45 Id. § 34:11-56a16.  
46 See supra note 33. 
47 Department of Industrial Relations, Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/. Disagreement between the California State Legislature, 
which wanted to increase the minimum wage, and the IWC, which did not, led the legislature to 
defund the IWC on July 1, 2004. The IWC remains defunded today, and its website states that 
“[t]he IWC is currently not in operation.”   
48 Victoria Bradshaw, Raise the Wage Threshold but Don’t Put It on Autopilot, CAPITOL 
WEEKLY  (June 8, 2006), http://capitolweekly.net/raise-the-wage-threshold-but-dont-put-it-on-
autopilot/. 
49 Andrew M. Cuomo, Opinion, Fast Food Workers Deserve a Raise, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/opinion/andrew-m-cuomo-fast-food-workers-
deserve-a-raise.html. As Cuomo noted, the New York Legislature had rejected his proposal to 
raise the minimum wage statutorily. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 654 (McKinney 2016); Id. § 655(1) (“A 
wage board shall be composed of not more than three representatives of employers, an equal 
number of representatives of employees and an equal number of persons selected from the 
general public.”); Mario J. Musolino, Acting Comm’r Labor, Determination Regarding Adequacy 




The Board Members—representatives from labor, business, and the general public—held 
hearings over the next forty-five days, across the state. 50  Workers organized by the Fight 
for $15 participated in great numbers at these hearings.51  On July 21, the Board 
announced its decision: $15 per hour for fast food restaurants that are part of chains with 
at least thirty outlets, to be phased in over the course of six years, with a faster phase-in 
for New York City.52  The wage board order was a significant victory, followed by 
another victory: a bill to raise the state-wide minimum wage to $15.  However, in the 
negotiations over the state-wide minimum, employers successfully mobilized to strip the 
Commissioner’s authority to establish higher minimums for particular occupations.  
Thus, the ultimate compromise bill curtailed the powers of future tripartite wage boards.53  
Still, the New York experience shows how tripartite structures can be used to engage 
workers in setting terms of work for entire industries. 
The New York example aside, where wage boards have operated, the potential for 
social bargaining has often been under-realized.  Unions have not frequently engaged the 
commissions through wide spread mobilization, testimony, and collective action. The 
boards, as currently conceived, also have structural limitations.  The ability of workers to 
use wage boards to their benefit largely depends on the identity of the governor in the 
state; he or she influences when such boards act and who constitutes them.  Thus, in 
California, for example, former Governor Schwarzengger tried to use the wage board to 
limit the legislature’s proposal to index the minimum wage.54  Moreover, in most cases, 
the neutral representatives on the commissions effectively decide disagreements. These 
individuals, selected by the partisan governors, serve as the swing votes and thereby 
minimize the extent to which true bargaining occurs. This weakness is pronounced when 




50  Fast Food Wage Board, N.Y. DEP’T LAB. 
http://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/wageboard2015.shtm. 
51 FAST FOOD WAGE BD., N.Y. DEP’T OF LAB., REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO 
THE NYS COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 10-11 (2015). 
52 Patrick McGeehan, Push to Lift Minimum Wage Is Now Serious Business, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 23, 2015). 
53 N.Y. L. 2016, ch. 54, part K, § 4. Existing wage orders remain in effect and New York law 
still allows the Commission to act regarding hours. See id. § 5; Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Comm’r of 
Labor, 34 N.Y.S. 3d 232, 235-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (discussing legislative history).  
54 See Erica Muñoz, Raising the California Minimum Wage is Not Enough: Creating a 
Sustainable Wage By Accounting For Inflation Through Indexing, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 423 
(2007); Bradshaw, supra note 48; Majorie Fochtman, From the Experts: Will the Revival of 
California’s Industrial Welfare Commission Reduce the Explosion of Wage and Hour Litigation 







Nonetheless, more could be done to use existing wage boards aggressively, as was 
done by the Fight for $15 in New York.  In jurisdictions where worker organizations have 
significant political influence, and where the executive branch is amenable, workers can 
petition wage boards to act.  Where statutes permit, they can demand sector-by-sector 
wage and benefit improvements, beyond minimum wage increases.  They can also 
engage workers in collective action designed to achieve such gains, as the Fight for $15 
did in New York. 
III. Expanding Tripartite Commissions,  Increasing Civic Participation, and 
Building Worker Power  
Progressive states and localities could also create more ambitious, participatory, 
and representative tripartite commissions.  A range of possibilities is worth exploring.  
First, state laws, or local laws where home rule power is sufficient, could give tripartite 
commissions broader mandates on a sector-by-sector basis, making clear that authority is 
not limited to setting a single minimum wage.  Sector-by-sector wages, benefits, working 
conditions, leave policies, and scheduling rights could all be included in the scope of the 
commissions’ work.  
Second, to respond to concerns about the transient nature of administrative gains, 
the laws could make clear that the statutory mandate is to provide for a living wage and 
quality benefits.  They could impose a cost of living wage increase as a default, or other 
default increases, creating a floor above which commissions would act.  The statutes 
could also require commissions to act periodically rather than only upon executive branch 
request or public petition, and could require super-majority votes for any decisions not to 
raise wages or improve benefits as scheduled.     
To ensure that the commission process actually involves representative worker 
organizations, the laws could further provide, building on the New Jersey model, that the 
composition of the commissions includes the elected leadership of NLRB-certified 
unions, other membership-based non-profit worker organizations in the particular sector, 
as well as leaders of the relevant industry groups and firms.  The commissions would 
require multiple representatives on both the worker and business side, depending on the 
size and diversity of the particular sector.  Another possibility would be to create systems 
by which workers throughout an industry could vote for representatives, selecting from 
among a slate of worker organizations; winners would then send representatives to serve 
on the commissions on a proportional basis.  
New tripartite commissions also might cabin the power of the governor, state 
labor commissioner, or local executive over substantive outcomes in order to ensure that 
real social bargaining occurs.  For example, the laws could create evenly split 
commissions, incorporating an arbitration process in the event of a stalemate, subject to 
state or local governmental review; they could require that the neutral representative on 




approved arbitrators; or they could even establish a mechanism for consumer or public 
representation through a new democratic process encouraging the growth of membership-
based consumer organizations.  
Whether through existing or new statutes, collective action by workers is an 
essential component of effective social bargaining.  Absent worker participation, tripartite 
commissions offer little promise.  To that end, the success of wage boards depends on 
active organizing efforts by worker organizations.  Workers engaged in such efforts 
would be entitled to protection under Section 7 of the NLRA, which protects concerted 
action, even through political channels and even among unorganized workers.55  Thus, 
workers could, as they did in New York, testify before wage boards, demonstrate in favor 
of certain results, and organize their co-workers.  Section 7 protects such activity even if 
the workers are not union members or seeking to form a union—as long as participation 
does not constitute unprotected or illegal activity.56  The statute also protects concerted 
political organizing in the workplace, as long as it occurs off duty, in a nondisruptive 
manner, and is otherwise in accordance with nondiscriminatory work rules.  
Of course, existing penalties for employer violations of Section 7 are weak.57 
Moreover, the current interpretation of Section 7 does not protect workers who withhold 
their labor in support of their wage and benefit demands unless those demands are 
directed at their employer.58  Nor does it protect workers who engage in partial strikes, 
planned intermittent work stoppages, or secondary economic activity to advance their 
demands.59  This doctrine has been persuasively critiqued,60 though Board and Court 
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reinterpretation seems unlikely in the near term.  In the meantime, worker organizations 
can structure their actions so that they fall within the protections of existing law. 
Finally, to function well, tripartite commissions should be combined with reforms 
that protect the right to organize and that strengthen worker organizations.  To be sure, 
many reforms to that end would require federal legislation or a change in preemption 
doctrine.61  For example, states cannot, when regulating employees and employers 
covered by the NLRA, increase penalties for violations of the NLRA, nor can they 
prohibit permanent replacements or protect secondary boycotts, or establish a system of 
works councils.  However, a few non-preempted reforms at the state and local level can 
accompany tripartite commissions.  One promising example is the recent New York City 
law that gives employees the option of deducting contributions to qualified nonprofit 
organizations that will advocate for workers but without engaging in traditional collective 
bargaining with employers.62  Other examples are laws that require the state or locality to 
compensate representatives for participation in wage boards, co-enforcement efforts like 
those described by Professors Fisk and Patel for this conference,63 and proposals to 
engage worker organizations in more benefit administration.64 
IV. Legal Challenges to State and Local Tripartite Commissions for 
Employees 
Greater use of tripartite commissions at the state and local level would 
undoubtedly come under legal challenge—but the best reading of the law supports a 
conclusion that such regimes are permissible.65   
 1. Federal Labor Law Preemption. Employers or other aggrieved parties would 
likely challenge both state and local legislation on NLRA preemption grounds.  The Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not preempt state and local wage legislation, as long as 
the non-federal benefits exceed the floors set by federal statutes.66  States can pass, for 
example, higher minimum wages, more protective scheduling laws, and paid sick time 
provisions; so too can localities, as long as their home rule provisions permit them to do 
so.  But opponents of social bargaining could potentially argue that once states or 
localities allow extensive social bargaining over wages and other terms or conditions in 
particular industries, they have entered the field of labor-management relations and are 
therefore subject to NLRA preemption.   
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In contrast to the FLSA, the NLRA’s preemption regime is extremely broad.67  
There are two key cases.  First, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon holds that 
states are prohibited from regulating activity that is even “arguably” protected or 
prohibited by federal law.68  Second, Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission69 holds that Congress’s decision to leave 
certain activity unregulated by the NLRA implied Congress’s intent that these forms of 
union and employer conduct be left completely unregulated.70  Where Congress left 
conduct “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces,”71 the states, like the 
NLRB, cannot regulate it.72  
Opponents of tripartite commissions could invoke Garmon, arguing that tripartite 
commissions require mandatory multi-employer bargaining, while the NLRA protects 
employers’ rights not to participate in such bargaining.  They might also argue that the 
NLRA expressly protects the right to refrain from unionization, and that wage boards 
effectively defeat that right.  In addition, opponents could rely on Machinists, claiming 
that local or state tripartite commissions engage in a form of collective bargaining over 
which the state exercises substantive control.  And, the argument would run, the NLRA 
clearly leaves the substantive outcome of bargaining “to be controlled by the free play of 
economic forces.”73  
 
Though one should not underestimate the risk of a negative ruling given the 
Supreme Court’s current composition, a preemption finding under either Garmon or 
Machinists would represent a significant departure from existing doctrine.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the prohibition against state actors shifting the balance 
of power in privately negotiated agreements,74 but it has never curtailed the ability of 
states and local governments to pass universally applicable employment legislation.  
Indeed, the Court has held that laws of general applicability are not preempted even when 
they “alter[] the economic balance between labor and management.”75  The Court has 
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also emphasized that, “When a state law establishes a minimal employment standard not 
inconsistent with the general legislative goals of the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the 
purposes of the Act.”76  Thus, the Court has upheld several state laws establishing 
workplace standards that would otherwise be negotiated in bargaining.77  
 
In the case of tripartite commissions, unions would not be obtaining exclusive 
bargaining agreements, multiemployer or otherwise.78 Wage board orders carry no 
requirement that the workers be members of a union, abstain from a union, or join a 
union.  Nor do they force employers to engage in collective bargaining.  Rather, tripartite 
commissions involve worker organizations and businesses in setting employment law.  
As courts have recognized “[i]t is now clear . . . that state substantive labor standards, 
including minimum wages, are not invalidated simply because they apply to particular 
trades, professions, or job classifications rather than to the entire labor market.”79  “[T]he 
substantive terms of employment, which does not govern the processes of collective 
bargaining or self-organization and is not inconsistent with the general goals of the 
NLRA is not subject to Machinists preemption.”80  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the above preemption analysis applies only to 
workers who fall within the NLRA’s scope.  Courts have long held that states can pass 
labor laws governing exempt workers—namely agricultural and domestic workers, 
independent contractors, and public sector employees—without confronting preemption 
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doctrine.81  For those workers, more ambitious sectoral bargaining, along with more 
protections for concerted action, could be enacted, subject to other legal constraints, 
discussed below. 
2. Equal Protection and Dormant Commerce Clause. Opponents are also likely to 
argue that tripartite commissions violate the equal protection and due process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and parallel state provisions and/or the federal dormant 
commerce clauses.  These arguments have been easily dismissed: the statutes have a 
rational basis and do not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state businesses.82  
Expansion of the scope of tripartite board activity is unlikely to change either analysis.    
3. Separation of Powers. A third line of challenge sounds in separation of powers 
law.  To date, opponents have gained little traction on claims that wage boards 
excessively delegate power to the executive branch or to private parties.  The statutes 
have survived review because they set forth a clear legislative policy position that cabins 
decisionmaking authority by the executive; they maintain ultimate decisionmaking 
authority in public officials, not in private parties; and they contain mechanisms to guard 
against arbitrary and capricious action.83  Any expansion of social bargaining at the state 
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or local level would have to maintain these basic characteristics.84  Thus, in states with 
separation-of-powers and administrative law doctrine that roughly parallel federal law, it 
would be critical that any tripartite wage statute set forth an “intelligible principle” and 
that ultimate decisionmaking authority rest with a state official, not with private parties.  
4. Home Rule and State Preemption. A fourth, and more significant, obstacle is 
that hostile state governments can eliminate the ability of localities to enact social 
bargaining statutes.  Municipal corporations are subdivisions of the state and only have 
authority to enact laws if the state has granted them such powers.85  Accordingly, state 
governments can deny localities authority to engage in social bargaining or can overrule 
particular social bargaining that occurs at the local level.  In circumstances where state 
government is more conservative than city or county government, elimination of home 
rule powers or rejection of particular regulations is a real danger.86  The threat may be 
pronounced where the locality is governed by a racial minority group lacking effective 
representation at the state level.87  For example, the Alabama legislature voted to nullify a 
City of Birmingham law that would have set the city’s minimum wage at $10.10.88  
Missouri recently rolled back St. Louis’ $10-an-hour minimum wage ordinance.89  Ohio’s 
legislature recently enacted a statute prohibiting localities from raising their minimum 
wages higher than the statewide minimum, in anticipation of the City of Cleveland’s 
scheduled vote to increase the city’s minimum wage to $15 an hour (the statute was 
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ultimately struck down).90  Several other states have passed or are considering similar 
legislation, bringing the total number of states with laws that prohibit local wage 
ordinances to twenty-five.91 
5. Antitrust. A final possible challenge comes from antitrust law—though this too 
should fail under existing precedent.  The Sherman Act makes unlawful “every contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade,” and punishes the act of 
“monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce” 
among states.92  Thus, private actors are prohibited from agreeing or otherwise colluding 
to achieve anticompetitive ends.  Agreements between individuals that directly affect 
prices are considered “per se” illegal.93  The antitrust laws, however, contain a labor 
exemption, which makes clear that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.94  An additional judicially 
crafted “non-statutory” labor exemption extends to parties who enter into agreements 
with unions.95 
 
Opponents to social bargaining statutes might argue that, because the labor 
exemption is not currently understood to cover independent contractors, social bargaining 
statutes governing such workers would violate the antitrust law.96  This argument should 
fail, however, because statutes allowing social bargaining by independent contractors 
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would fall squarely within the “state action” exception to the antitrust laws.97  That 
exemption, also known as Parker immunity, allows states to enact anticompetitive 
regulation when acting in their sovereign capacities. 98  In establishing a wage board, or 
enabling a locality to establish a wage board, for independent contractors the state would 
be “clearly articulat[ing] and affirmatively express[ing] state policy.” 99  Moreover, the 
wage boards would be actively supervised by state officials, with state officials retaining 




In this era of striking economic and political inequality, reforming labor and 
employment law and rebuilding worker organizations are essential.  With federal reform 
not currently possible, engaging workers and their organizations in state and local 
tripartite commissions is a step in the right direction.  When combined with active worker 
organizing efforts and additional reforms that strengthen worker organization, state and 
local tripartism can function as an important building block of a more egalitarian and 
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